The Governor General tends to use none of the powers you're talking about being a threat. Suggesting a president would use them where the GG didn't is probably a bit outlandish.
Legally our links to Britain have slowed down enormously the development of our legal system. Hardly a good thing. Anyway, Britain's influence on us is less than America, whom we have no monarchical ties to.
It's hardly outlandish.
Under the current Constitutional framework the Governor-General chooses not to exercise their reserve powers because of two things.
The first is convention. I assume that as a law student you have at least some cursory familiarity with the Constitution. If you do you will notice that it reads quite strangely. The Governor-General is mentioned prominently, yet no mention is made of the Prime Minister! Obviously, the way that the Constitution says things should be done is not, on face value, how they are actually done. While the Governor-General is nominally capable of appointing ministers, calling elections and so forth, the established convention is that such things should only be done on Ministerial advice (this is, however, mentioned nowhere in the Constitution). So the Prime Minister 'advises' the GG to appoint Ministers, they 'advise' the GG to call elections and so forth. It is through the doctrine of convention that the confusing differences between the Constitution and RL are reconciled and through convention that the stipulations of the Constitution
are actually carried out - it is not simply a case of ignoring the written words as Existential suggests. However, if various other conventions - such as blocking supply - are broken, then reserve powers most certainly become an option.
The second reason is the way in which Governor Generals are appointed. This is another process of convention, where the Prime Minister 'advises' the Queen on who she should (/will) appoint. In the same way, the Prime Minister can also 'advise' the Queen to recall the Governor-General. So therefore, if the GG breaks with convention in a severe and unauthorised way, they will most likely be recalled by the Queen (she can of course decline if there is no reason for the GG to be recalled and a dubious ploy by the PM is suspected).
If we became a republic, this advisory link would be severed. Current opinion polls suggest that the majority of Republicans would like a directly-elected President to replace the GG. This would give the GG an electoral mandate which could easily turn out to be destructive.
Firstly, the brake on the President's power, the threat of recall by the Queen, would no longer exist. Therefore they would have less incentive to adhere to convention. If a political or constitutional crisis developed for some reason, the only authority that could sack the President would be Parliament. BUT - both have been elected by the people! Plus, the President is the head of state! Under the Constitution they control the executive and the military! So whose mandate to govern is superior? How can this crisis be solved?
Constitutions that rely on convention to function are not set up for republican government. Other Commonwealth countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, which essentially grafted a minimalist republic on to a monarchical constitution and not long ago suffered a messy power struggle between the prime minister, parliament and president, plainly highlight this fact. A Presidential mandate from the people, coupled with a reduction in the power of convention, could have serious implications for the balance of political power.
You say that such a thing may not happen often, and I would agree. However, it only takes one crisis for these problems to come to the fore and cause serious destabilisation.
Also, your assertion that English law has somehow slowed the development of Australian law is quite false. Firstly, English common law has not been binding in Australia since before Federation. The Australian legislature was deliberately designed to be different to the British Parliamentary system and furthermore, it was in fact Australians who deliberately chose to retain ties to English statutory law, not vice versa. The Australian Parliament held the power to cut its legislative dependence on Britain long before it actually did so.
. ATM it's mostly arts, but it's all interesting. Just started, so a fair way to go though, lol
