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help on ww1 (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter supraz
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annabackwards
<3 Prophet 9
1st off it was because the Schlieffen Plan failed. If it had succeeded Germany would just have won the war but it didn't succeed.
Secondly, both sides in WWIfound themselves in defensive positions and so opportunities to use different strategies were basically nil. The Generals believed attrition warfare was the only way to win the war. The reason for this was because that was the closest strategy to the old cavalry battles. Bring in your soldiers and fight with the enemy until one side admits defeat.
The Generals believed this was the way to go and it was only further into the war that they actually realised it was a Stalemate and began to develop new weapons (such as the tanks and gas) and new tactics (such as stormtroopers for the Germans).
Also, after the Battle of Verdun and France's victory, attrition warfare appeared to be working but in reality both sides were just losing more and more men.
Secondly, both sides in WWIfound themselves in defensive positions and so opportunities to use different strategies were basically nil. The Generals believed attrition warfare was the only way to win the war. The reason for this was because that was the closest strategy to the old cavalry battles. Bring in your soldiers and fight with the enemy until one side admits defeat.
The Generals believed this was the way to go and it was only further into the war that they actually realised it was a Stalemate and began to develop new weapons (such as the tanks and gas) and new tactics (such as stormtroopers for the Germans).
Also, after the Battle of Verdun and France's victory, attrition warfare appeared to be working but in reality both sides were just losing more and more men.
Kittikhun
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Secondly, both sides in WWI found themselves in defensive positions and so opportunities to use different strategies were basically nil. The Generals believed attrition warfare was the only way to win the war. The reason for this was because that was the closest strategy to the old cavalry battles. Bring in your soldiers and fight with the enemy until one side admits defeat.
True, but with a little flaw since the Allied commanders only used the tactic of attrition when their offensives failed epitomised in the case of Haig commanding the BEF from 1916-18. Many Allied commanders still used and believed in the tactic of trying to break out from the stalemate of trench warfare and starting mobile warfare again to win the war, mainly enthusing their trust for cavalry. Look at the battle plans and objectives of the Third Battle of Ypres or of the Battle of Amiens. Remember that the Allied commanders had politicians behind their backs and if they saw that the tactic of attrition was going to be used the offensive would not go ahead. Allied commanders never implemented the tactic of attrition until their offensives failed where they only did so to look for a scapegoat so that they could keep their commanding positions.
Trench warfare also benefited the defender so hardly any breakthroughs were possible and the commanders had no idea how to breakthrough when their offensives failed especially after the failure of both armies to outflank each in the Race to the Sea. The commanders didn't know what to do or were still dreaming of the cavalry charges and when these failed the tactic of attrition was used.
Political pressure was also there too to breakout so the higher ups had no choice but to keep on pushing on or else they would lose their positions like the former commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir John French, did. The fact is, no knew how to break out of the stalemate and the only way possible was to keep on putting the pressure on the enemy and therefore there was attrition. The battlefield on the Western Front wasn't like the battlefields in the Eastern Front or the Middle East where mobile warfare was possible. This was evident throughout the war even with the advent of tanks and aircraft. When you look at the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918, there were hardly any gains you could say that were real breakthroughs that were expected by the Allied commanders even though the German army was in full retreat and beyond exhaustion from their failed March offensive (Operation Michael).
The fact of incompetent commanders was plays a factor. Field Marshal Haig, in all his wisdom, believed in attrition and put on offensives in conditions that weren't possible. He never visited the front (instead living in a comfy chateau kilometres back from the battles he was commanding) and belived that wars were won by the soldier's spirit. He didn't realise and understand the effects of technology in the modern battlefield and this affected his battle plans until he finally realised and accepted that technology did play a prominent part in the war and actually implemented them in his plans late during the war during the Amiens offensive of 1918. He believed, as he was raised as a cavalry man, that if the soldiers kept on pushing on there would eventually be a breakthrough and the war would be won. He belived it was the soldier's spirit that won battles and not technology and this man commanded the BEF from 1916 to 1918.
Also, after the Battle of Verdun and France's victory, attrition warfare appeared to be working but in reality both sides were just losing more and more men.
True, but in different forms. After the battle of Verdun and General Erich von Falkhenheyn's removal from the position of supreme commander of German forces in the Western Front, Germany never commited another offensive on the Western Front until Ludendorff's Operation Michael in March 1918 where the tactic of mobile warfare, that proved successful on the Eastern Front against Russia, was used instead of attrition that was used at Verdun. They instead, ironically, used the French tactic at Verdun where they concentrated on the tactic of defence in attrition on the enemy in the Hindenburg Line, rather than committing offensives of attrition, hoping to lower British morale as higher British casualties returned home as they tried to break through the line.
The Allies implemented the tactic of attrition when their offensives failed and there was no possibility of a breakthrough. Also, Haig wanted to prove that ground and progress was being made so he could keep his position as supreme commander of the BEF. This is shown in the Battle of the Somme, where he ordered the offensive to continue in October and November 1916 when the winter was about to set even though there was no chance of a breakthrough, to have something to say at Chantilly that his offensive was a success and that Germany was on her heels and will have no more men to fight the war any longer. The French also didn't use the tactic of attrition after the failure of General Neville's offensive in the Aisne in 1917.
Sorry about paraphrasing in my post. I'm too lazy to fix it up.
I recommend you read Les Carolyn's The Great War. It's a long read and he uses a lot of sophisticated language but he covers the political and military aspects of the Western Front even though it is based on the Australian experience there. 770 pages long but medium to big text. Read it during the holidays.
True, but with a little flaw since the Allied commanders only used the tactic of attrition when their offensives failed epitomised in the case of Haig commanding the BEF from 1916-18. Many Allied commanders still used and believed in the tactic of trying to break out from the stalemate of trench warfare and starting mobile warfare again to win the war, mainly enthusing their trust for cavalry. Look at the battle plans and objectives of the Third Battle of Ypres or of the Battle of Amiens. Remember that the Allied commanders had politicians behind their backs and if they saw that the tactic of attrition was going to be used the offensive would not go ahead. Allied commanders never implemented the tactic of attrition until their offensives failed where they only did so to look for a scapegoat so that they could keep their commanding positions.
Trench warfare also benefited the defender so hardly any breakthroughs were possible and the commanders had no idea how to breakthrough when their offensives failed especially after the failure of both armies to outflank each in the Race to the Sea. The commanders didn't know what to do or were still dreaming of the cavalry charges and when these failed the tactic of attrition was used.
Political pressure was also there too to breakout so the higher ups had no choice but to keep on pushing on or else they would lose their positions like the former commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir John French, did. The fact is, no knew how to break out of the stalemate and the only way possible was to keep on putting the pressure on the enemy and therefore there was attrition. The battlefield on the Western Front wasn't like the battlefields in the Eastern Front or the Middle East where mobile warfare was possible. This was evident throughout the war even with the advent of tanks and aircraft. When you look at the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918, there were hardly any gains you could say that were real breakthroughs that were expected by the Allied commanders even though the German army was in full retreat and beyond exhaustion from their failed March offensive (Operation Michael).
The fact of incompetent commanders was plays a factor. Field Marshal Haig, in all his wisdom, believed in attrition and put on offensives in conditions that weren't possible. He never visited the front (instead living in a comfy chateau kilometres back from the battles he was commanding) and belived that wars were won by the soldier's spirit. He didn't realise and understand the effects of technology in the modern battlefield and this affected his battle plans until he finally realised and accepted that technology did play a prominent part in the war and actually implemented them in his plans late during the war during the Amiens offensive of 1918. He believed, as he was raised as a cavalry man, that if the soldiers kept on pushing on there would eventually be a breakthrough and the war would be won. He belived it was the soldier's spirit that won battles and not technology and this man commanded the BEF from 1916 to 1918.
Also, after the Battle of Verdun and France's victory, attrition warfare appeared to be working but in reality both sides were just losing more and more men.
True, but in different forms. After the battle of Verdun and General Erich von Falkhenheyn's removal from the position of supreme commander of German forces in the Western Front, Germany never commited another offensive on the Western Front until Ludendorff's Operation Michael in March 1918 where the tactic of mobile warfare, that proved successful on the Eastern Front against Russia, was used instead of attrition that was used at Verdun. They instead, ironically, used the French tactic at Verdun where they concentrated on the tactic of defence in attrition on the enemy in the Hindenburg Line, rather than committing offensives of attrition, hoping to lower British morale as higher British casualties returned home as they tried to break through the line.
The Allies implemented the tactic of attrition when their offensives failed and there was no possibility of a breakthrough. Also, Haig wanted to prove that ground and progress was being made so he could keep his position as supreme commander of the BEF. This is shown in the Battle of the Somme, where he ordered the offensive to continue in October and November 1916 when the winter was about to set even though there was no chance of a breakthrough, to have something to say at Chantilly that his offensive was a success and that Germany was on her heels and will have no more men to fight the war any longer. The French also didn't use the tactic of attrition after the failure of General Neville's offensive in the Aisne in 1917.
Sorry about paraphrasing in my post. I'm too lazy to fix it up.
I recommend you read Les Carolyn's The Great War. It's a long read and he uses a lot of sophisticated language but he covers the political and military aspects of the Western Front even though it is based on the Australian experience there. 770 pages long but medium to big text. Read it during the holidays.
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